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In recent years, a number of Ockham’s commentators have been 
converging around a broadly externalist reading of his theory of mental 
content.  Noting the emphasis he places on the role of (efficient) causation in 
his account of concept formation and mental representation, these 
commentators argue that, on Ockham’s view, the content of a given mental 
state is determined, at least in part, by its causal connections to objects in the 
environment.1   The aim of this paper is to challenge this increasingly 
prominent interpretation by focusing on Ockham’s account of singular 
thought—or what he himself refers to as ‘intuitive cognition’.  This focus 
makes sense because those who defend the externalist reading of Ockham’s 
theory of content typically build their case on his account of intuitive 
cognition.  Nor is it hard to see why.  Ockham not only places particular stress 
on role of causality in his account of intuitive states, but also assigns a 
foundational role to intuition in his broader account of mental content.  Any 
grounds for rejecting an externalist interpretation of Ockham’s theory of 
intuitive cognition will, therefore, count likewise against the externalist reading 
as whole.   
On the standard externalist reading, intuitive cognitions are mental states 
that are individuated by their causal connection to some singular object.  In 
fact, on this reading, intuitive cognitions turn out to be directly referential 
mental states since their content is taken to be wholly coincident with the 
individual object to which they are causally linked.  Although this 
interpretation is suggested by a number of things Ockham himself says, and is 
defended by a host of his best commentators, there are, as we shall see, at least 
two serious problems for accepting it: first, causal externalism does not square 
with Ockham’s account of supernaturally produced intuitive cognition; second, 
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taking intuitive cognitions to be directly referential sits uneasily both with 
Ockham’s own characterization of the intentional structure of intuitive states 
and with his account of their role in the formation of perceptual judgments. 
 
1. INTUITIVE COGNITION: THE EXTERNALIST, DIRECT REFERENTIALIST 
INTERPRETATION 
  
Ockham divides mental (i.e., intellective) states into two broad categories: 
those that are propositional in content (complexa) and those that are not 
(simplex).2  He then further subdivides the latter into the following categories: 
those that are intuitive and those that are abstractive.  Intuitive states, as 
Ockham characterizes them, are acts of perceptual acquaintance in which one 
is directly or immediately aware of some object.3  Such states are, moreover, 
always singular in content; in intuition one is presented with one individual 
thing (this human, or that color).  As Ockham explains:  
 
A non-propositional cognition (cognitio simplex) that is proper to a singular thing…is 
an intuitive cognition. … That an [intuitive act] is proper to one singular thing is clear 
since it is immediately caused (or is naturally suited to be caused) by the singular 
thing, and it is not naturally suited be caused by any other singular thing—even one of 
the same species.4  
 
As this passage makes clear, Ockham understands the intentional or referential 
properties of intuitive cognitions in terms of their causal link to individual 
objects.  As he sees it, an act of intuition refers to precisely that object which, 
in the natural course of things, causes or occasions its occurrence.   
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As it turns out, intuitive states are characterized not only in terms of their 
object, but also in terms of the relations they bear to other mental states.  
Indeed, what most distinguishes intuitive from abstractive states, on Ockham’s 
view, is the fact that intuitive cognitions are such that, by their very nature, 
they lead to the formation of a variety of perceptual judgments.  Ockham holds 
that whenever there is an intuitive cognition of some object, that intuition will 
always and immediately give rise to a number of “evident” judgments 
regarding both that object’s existence and its perceptible attributes.  He puts it 
this way: 
 
An intuitive cognition of a thing is a cognition such that by virtue of it we can know 
whether the thing exists or not (so that if the thing does exist, the intellect at once 
judges that it exists and evidently knows that it exists).  … Likewise, an intuitive 
cognition is such that when certain things are cognized and one inheres in the 
other…by virtue of this non-propositional cognition of such things one immediately 
knows whether a thing inheres or does not inhere… Thus, if Socrates is in fact white, 
then a cognition of Socrates and whiteness is said to be an intuitive cognition when, in 
virtue of such a cognition, one can evidently know that Socrates is white.5  
 
Because intuitive states are defined by their role in perception and judgment, 
Ockham appeals to these same roles to distinguish them from abstractive 
cognitions. Thus, abstractive cognitions are such that they neither give rise to 
nor serve as grounds for perceptual judgments.6  This is because, unlike 
intuitive states, abstractive cognitions are perfectly general in content and are 
also such that they yield no information regarding either the present existence 
or the contingent features of individual things.  According to Ockham, 
abstractive states not only “regard something as abstracted from many 
singulars,” but also “abstract from existence and non-existence, and from all 
the other conditions which contingently belong to or are predicated of a 
thing”.7   
As the foregoing makes clear, Ockham’s theory of intuition is central both 
to his epistemology and to his theory of mind and mental representation.  Until 
quite recently, however, the literature on Ockham’s account of intuitive 
cognition has tended to focus only on the epistemological significance of 
intuition and, in particular, on questions about the justificatory role of such 
states vis-à-vis the beliefs or judgments formed on the basis of them.  But in 
the past few years interest has increasingly turned to issues surrounding the 
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implications of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition for his broader views 
about the nature of mental representation and, in particular, to questions about 
its bearing on his theory of concepts and mental language. 
As scholars have long been aware, Ockham devotes considerable attention 
to the project of developing a systematic account of the nature and structure of 
mental language.  On his view, all thought (that is, all intellective cognition) 
occurs as a kind of inner language—one structured in much the way natural 
language is.  Given this, it is natural to expect that Ockham’s distinction 
between intuitive and abstractive cognition answers to something in his 
account of mental language.  Since Ockham himself never explicitly marks 
such connections, however, mapping his theory of intuition and abstraction 
onto his theory of mental language requires a bit of reconstruction.   
In his recent book, Ockham on Concepts, Claude Panaccio offers just such 
a reconstruction.  In fact, he dedicates the first chapter of his book to teasing 
out the relationship between the epistemological vocabulary of intuitive and 
abstractive cognition and the logical and semantical categories in terms of 
which Ockham characterizes the language of thought.8  Starting with acts of 
abstractive cognition, Panaccio argues, quite persuasively, that such states 
function in mental language as general expressions—“mental common nouns”, 
as it were.9  That abstractive cognitions are semantically general is clear not 
only from the fact that Ockham explicitly characterizes them as states that 
“abstract from singulars”, but also from his claim that the intentionality of an 
act of abstractive cognition is determined by a relation of “likeness” or 
“similarity” to what it represents.  After all, Panaccio reasons, if relations of 
similitude or likeness determine the content of abstractive acts, such acts are, at 
least in principle, capable of representing any number of (relevantly similar) 
entities and, so, are general in representational function.10  As mental common 
nouns, therefore, acts of abstractive cognition turn out to be among the basic, 
categorematic units of mental language.   
Like abstractive acts, intuitive cognitions also function as semantic and 
syntactic units of mental language.  Unlike abstractive acts, however, they 
clearly function as singular terms since they are causally and referentially tied 
to a single object.  But what kind of singular term are they?  Over the course of 
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his discussion, Panaccio surveys a number of ways they might be classified. 
Ultimately, however, he argues for the introduction of a “special semantical 
and syntactical category, [one] which presents strong similarities with what 
Bertrand Russell used to call ‘proper names in the logical sense’.”  As he 
explains:    
 
A logically proper name, in Russell’s view, is never given but to a single referent, 
with which the speaker must at some point have been directly acquainted, this 
episode of direct acquaintance having fixed once and for all the referent for this 
particular designator. Ockham’s intuitive cognitions are direct designators too: they 
do not have descriptive contents, any more than Russell’s logically proper names 
do. And they presuppose a direct acquaintance of the agent with the object. The 
requirement of acquaintance, however, is even stronger in the case of Ockham’s 
intuitive cognitions since such cognitions simply cannot occur (in the natural order) 
in the absence of their objects.11  
 
According to Panaccio, intuitive cognitions are best understood as directly 
referential (mental) expressions.  On his reading, intuitive states are utterly 
devoid of descriptive content and, so, are such that they “refer to their objects 
without the help of any form of description, of any general concept, or of any 
intermediary whatsoever.”12  Accordingly, he insists that “in the case of 
intuitive cognition it is causality…which determines signification.”13  
Ultimately, therefore, Panaccio contends that intuitive acts should be classified 
as ‘rigid dietics’—that is, as states that “literally show their object (this is the 
diexis aspect) and never change them (this is the rigidity).”14  
Although Panaccio does not, at least in this context, explicitly use the term 
‘externalism’ to describe Ockham’s account of intuitive cognition, it should be 
clear that the account does turn out to be externalist.15  For purposes of 
discussion in what follows, it will be useful to think of the version of 
externalism Panaccio attributes to Ockham in terms of two distinct theses: 
(1) The content of an intuitive state is individuated broadly in terms of its causal 
connection to some object.  
(2) The content of an intuitive state just is the object to which it is causally linked. 
The first thesis (call it the ‘causal thesis’) follows from Panaccio’s claim that 
intuitions are determined by their causal relation to their objects; the second 
thesis (call it the ‘direct reference thesis’) captures his view that intuitions are 
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“direct designators” lacking any internal, descriptive content.  Now, while the 
causal thesis alone is sufficient to secure an externalist interpretation of 
Ockham’s theory of intuition, its conjunction with the direct reference thesis 
yields a radically externalist interpretation since it rules out any “two-factor” 
account of intuitive content.  On this reading, there is no possibility that 
intuitive cognitions have, in addition to their broad (or object-dependent) 
content, any kind of narrow (or object-independent) content.  
Panaccio is not alone in reading Ockham’s account of intuition as a form of 
externalism.  Marilyn Adams has advanced a similar reading.  Like Panaccio, 
Adams seems to be committed to the causal thesis since she too sees Ockham 
as giving pride of place to causality in the determination of intuitive states.  In 
fact, she explains Ockham’s (mature) account of intuitive cognition by 
comparing it to contemporary, causal theories of proper names.16  What is 
more, she also sees a resemblance between Ockham’s intuitive cognitions and 
Russell’s logically proper names—though, in the end, she appears to shy away 
from the direct reference thesis.17  Other commentators, however, have been 
perfectly willing to embrace both aspects of the radical externalist 
interpretation.  Peter King, for example, not only explicitly commits himself to 
the causal thesis, asserting that Ockham “endors[es] a causal theory of proper 
names in Mental Language”, but also advances something like the direct 
reference thesis.18  According to King, Ockham has “no need to postulate 
independent contents or indeed any discernible intrinsic structure to the 
[intuitive] mental act.”19  In much the same vein, Calvin Normore attributes 
both theses to Ockham, saying that he holds a “causal externalism of the ‘bare 
concepts’ sort.”20   
While similar interpretations have been advanced by still other scholars, 
the foregoing is sufficient to establish both the nature of the currently 
prevailing interpretation of intuitive cognition and the weight of the authority 
                                                 
16
  Marilyn Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press Adams, 
1987), ch. 4. Adams sees a development in Ockham’s account of intuitive cognition.  On her 
view, the nature of this development “invite[s] a comparison with the contemporary movement 
away from a Russellian analysis of proper names.” (137)  
17
  Ibid., 136-138.   
18
  See King, “Rethinking Representation”. 
19
  Ibid.  In “Thinking About Things”, King makes roughly the same point:  “the content of 
these mental acts [namely, of intuitive cognitions] is not an internal feature of the mind.  
Instead it is determined by the external world, in particular, by the very item that caused the 
intuitive cognition.” 
20
  Normore, “Burge, Descartes, and Us,” 5.  See also his “Ockham on Mental Language,” 56-
57.  While Normore holds that both abstractive and intuitive states are purely externalist, 
Panaccio resists this claim when it comes to abstractive cognition.  See Panaccio, “Ockham’s 
Externalism”. 
 7 
behind it.21  As suggested earlier, moreover, the externalist interpretation of 
Ockham’s account of intuitive cognition forms the basis of the externalist 
reading of his theory of mental content in general.  On Ockham’s view, as 
King aptly puts it, intuitive cognitions are, “the building blocking of mental 
life.”22   Concept formation, for example, begins with intuition; all abstractive 
acts (i.e. general concepts) are causally connected to prior acts of intuition.  
Likewise, acts of intuition partly constitute the perceptual and existential 
judgments based on them.  If, therefore, the content of intuitive states is 
externally individuated the concepts and judgments formed from them would 
have to be as well.  This is, in any case, what commentators have tended to 
suppose. 
It must be acknowledged that there is much in Ockham’s texts that appears 
to support the foregoing picture.  Not only is it clear that all cognition begins 
with intuitive cognition, but there can be no denying that Ockham places 
considerable emphasis on causality in his account of intuitive cognition.  
Consider, for example, his remarks in the following two passages (on which all 
the aforementioned commentators rely) 
 
Intuitive cognition is the proper cognition of a singular not because of its greater 
likeness to one thing more than another but because it is naturally caused by one thing 
and not by another; nor can it be caused by another. 23 
 
For this reason, likeness is not a sufficient explanation (causa praecisa) for why one 
thinks about one thing and not another. …[an intuition], from its nature, determines 
for itself that it leads the intellect into cognition of that object by which it is partially 
caused (and it so determines for itself that it is caused by that object that it cannot be 
caused by any other).24 
 
As these passages show, Ockham does appeal—and quite explicitly—to 
causality in his explanation of the connection between intuitive cognitions and 
the objects to which they refer.  And Ockham certainly does say things that 
could be taken to imply that he thinks this causal connection is what 
determines the content of intuitive states.  Perhaps one of the most suggestive 
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passages in this regard is one where Ockham is considering two angels—call 
them ‘Gabriel’ and ‘Michael’—one of whom is looking into the mind of the 
other.  In the example, Michael is intuiting some object, and Gabriel is 
attempting to read Michael’s mind—to see what he’s cognizing.  According to 
Ockham, Gabriel will be unable to determine what object Michael is thinking 
about:  
 
One [angel] who intuitively see an act of cognition of some singular [in another’s 
mind] does not, nevertheless, intuitively see the singular thing itself…. For, even if 
an angel were to intuitively see the act of cognition of some singular (and, we may 
suppose, also intuitively sees the singular thing itself), nevertheless, he would not 
see that that cognition [in the mind of the other] is of this singular. …Indeed, even 
if there were only one singular thing near to the intellect [of the other] still the angel 
could not evidently know that this cognition is of that singular…25 
 
One natural explanation for why Gabriel can’t determine the content of 
Michael’s intuition is that, on Ockham’s view, the content of an intuitive act 
isn’t “in the head”.  In any case, Ockham’s remarks in this context, especially 
when taken together his with repeated emphasis on the role of causality in 
intuition, make the causal externalist reading look tempting. 
Yet, despite the suggestive nature of these texts and the cumulative weight 
of the authorities who draw an externalist moral from them, there is reason to 
reject the externalist interpretation of Ockham’s account.  To see why, it will 
be useful to begin by considering Ockham’s account of supernaturally 
produced intuitive cognition.  Supernatural cases of intuition appear to tell 
strongly against the causal thesis and, so, against any causal externalist 
interpretation of intuition (radical or not).  To be sure, all of the commentators 
mentioned above are perfectly aware of the supernatural cases of intuitive 
cognition and of the theological considerations that motivate them.26  My own 
conviction, however, is that they have not sufficiently attended to the 
implications of such cases.    
 
2. AGAINST CAUSAL EXTERNALISM:  SUPERNATURALLY PRODUCED INTUITIVE 
COGNITION 
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In nearly every context in which Ockham discusses intuitive cognition he 
acknowledges, at least implicitly, the possibility of supernaturally caused 
intuitive cognitions.  For this reason, his willingness to allow for miraculous 
intuitions cannot be seen as a mere slip on his part, or some peripheral feature 
of the account; rather, it’s at the very center.  In fact, Ockham’s standard way 
of characterizing intuitive cognition is calculated to allow for the possibility of 
divine intervention.  The following passage is representative in this regard: 
 
Intuitive cognition of a thing is a cognition such that by virtue of it we are able to 
know whether a thing exists or does not exist so that, if the thing does exist, the 
intellect immediately judges that it exists and evidently knows that it exists (unless, 
by chance, it is impeded on account of some imperfection in this cognition).  In the 
same way, if, by divine power, God were to preserve a perfect intuitive cognition of 
a thing that no longer exists, by virtue of this non-propositional cognition the 
intellect would cognize that that thing does not exist.27 
 
As Ockham points out in this passage (and many others like it), intuitive 
cognitions provide grounds not only for judgments regarding the existence of 
the objects intuited, but also for judgments regarding the non-existence of 
some object.28  Cases in which the intuitive act yields a judgment regarding the 
non-existence of some object are precisely those in which the intuitive 
cognition is supernaturally produced, since in them there is no existing object 
to serve as cause for the intuitive act in question.  Yet, while the intuitive act is, 
in such cases, the result of God’s causal activity, it does not necessarily 
produce any error on the part of the cognizer—for Ockham claims that the 
ensuing judgment is that the relevant object does not exist.  
The specific case Ockham is envisioning above is one in which God 
intervenes to conserve an intuitive act after the object of such an act is 
removed or destroyed.  But this represents only one of a variety of ways in 
which Ockham thinks God could intervene.  For my purposes, the following 
two cases are more instructive:  
 
[CASE 1] Through intuitive cognition we judge a thing to exist when it exists—and 
this is the case generally whether the intuitive cognition is naturally caused or 
supernaturally caused by God alone.  If it is naturally caused, then it cannot exist 
unless the object exists and is present in the required proximity. …  
If, however, it is supernaturally caused—say, if God were to cause in me an 
intuitive cognition of some object existing in Rome—immediately, upon the 
possession of the intuitive cognition of it, I could judge that what I intuit and see 
exists, just as much as if I had the cognition naturally.  Now, you may say that the 
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object is not present here and is not in the required proximity to me.  I reply that 
although intuitive cognition cannot be naturally caused except when the object is 
present in the required proximity, still, it can be supernaturally caused. … 
[CASE 2]  Similarly, I can judge, by means of an intuitive cognition, that a thing 
does not exist when it does not. … For instance, if God were to cause in me the 
intuitive cognition of some non-existent object and were to conserve that cognition 
in me, then, by means of that cognition, I could judge that the thing does not exist.  
For, seeing that thing intuitively and forming this mental sentence, “this object does 
not exist”, the intellect, in virtue of the intuitive cognition, immediately assents to 
this sentence—and dissents from its opposite—in such a way that the intuitive 
cognition is the partial cause of the assent (as was said before about natural 
intuition).  And so, consequently, the intellect assents that what I intuit is pure 
nothing.29  
 
In Case 1, Ockham allows that God could produce (and conserve) in me an 
intuitive cognition of an object that in fact does exist, but which does not exist 
anywhere in my proximate environment (but rather in Rome).  What this 
shows, is that on Ockham’s view it is possible for me to have an intuitive 
cognition of (along with any number of evident judgments about) an object 
that is at a significant distance from me, and perhaps is such that I’ve never 
encountered it at all.  In Case 2, Ockham allows that God could cause (and 
conserve) an intuitive cognition of an object that does not exist at all—not near 
me, not in Rome, not anywhere.  What this case shows is that Ockham is 
willing to countenance even the possibility of intuition of non-existent objects. 
On the face of it, these cases look to be straightforward counter-examples 
to the causal thesis.  After all, to allow that there could be intuitive cognition of 
objects with which a cognizer has no causal contact (or which do not exist) 
would certainly seem to vitiate the claim that Ockham places causal 
requirements on the individuation or determination of intuitive states.  As it 
turns out, however, matters are not so simple.  This is because Ockham is 
willing to speak of supernaturally produced intuitions in ways that suggest that 
such acts still bear some kind of causal relation to their objects.   
In order to get clear about the precise implications of supernaturally caused 
intuitions for the standard interpretation, it will be useful to begin by 
distinguishing between two types of view that go by the name ‘externalism’ in 
the contemporary literature: strong and weak externalism, respectively.30  
Strong externalism is the view that a given mental state depends (for its 
existence and identity) on the existence of some entity in the subject’s 
environment.  Weak externalism, by contrast, is the view that a mental state 
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depends (for its existence and identity) merely on the existence of some 
external entity somewhere or other.  Thus, whereas strong externalism ties a 
mental state to the part of the world the subject inhabits, weak externalism 
does not; weak externalism does not, in other words, require the relevant entity 
to exist in any proximity to the subject whatsoever.  Now, insofar as 
commentators see Ockham as appealing to causal connections for the 
determination of intuitive states it would appear that they mean to be 
attributing to him some version of strong externalism since, intuitively, we can 
stand in causal relations only to things which exist in some spatio-temporal 
proximity to us—or, in any case, it would certainly seem that acts of 
perception can be caused only by objects existing in our immediate 
environment.    
But if we return to our two cases, it would seem that Case 1 is sufficient to 
rule out any version of strong externalism.  For while Ockham thinks that, in 
the natural course of things, intuitive cognitions are caused only by objects 
existing in our immediate proximity, nevertheless, in Case 1 he allows for the 
possibility of our having, via supernatural means, an intuition of objects that 
exist at a great distance from us—of objects which play no role in bringing 
about the intuition of them.  But, then, for the same reason, it would appear 
that intuitive cognitions are not strongly externalist since they do not require 
any causal connection to objects existing in the subject’s environment.31  
Of course, even if this is right, Case 1 is not sufficient to show that 
intuitive cognitions are not still in some important way object-dependent—that 
is, it does not show that such states are not in any respect individuated by a 
relation to external entities.  But we shouldn’t forget about Case 2.  Here, 
Ockham allows that there could, in principle, be an intuitive cognition of what 
does not exist at all.  Again as he himself says (at the end of the foregoing 
passage), in such cases “what I intuit is pure nothing” (purum nihil).  But, 
clearly, this would seem to imply that intuitive cognitions are not object-
dependent in any respect and, hence, to rule out any version of externalism, 
strong or weak.32   
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  In fact, whereas Case 1 may be sufficient to rule out the causal thesis (since it allows for 
intuition of objects with which the cognizer has had no causal contact), Case 2 appears to rule 
out both the causal and direct reference thesis (since it allows for intuition of what does not 
exist).  More on direct reference in §. 3 below. 
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This is where matters get complicated.  The complication lies in the fact 
that Ockham says a number of things (both in connection with Case 1 and 2 
above as well as in other contexts) which might be taken to suggest that some 
version of the causal thesis and, hence, some form of causal externalism may, 
nevertheless, be viable after all—even in cases of intuition of non-existents.  
Consider, for example, his remarks in the following passage: 
 
You may say that God can directly and totally cause an intention, and in that 
case…causality does not produce an intention [which is] of one thing but not of another.  
After all, it is directly caused by nothing other than God. To this, I reply that any 
intention of a creature that is caused by God [is such that it] could be (partially) caused 
by a creature, even if, in fact, it is not so caused.  Therefore, the intention cognizes that 
singular thing by which it would be determinately caused if it were caused by a 
creature.33   
 
And, again:  
 
You may claim that [an intuitive cognition] can be caused by God alone, and I 
admit that this is true. But such a vision is always naturally suited to be caused by 
one object and not by another; and if it is naturally caused, it can be caused only by 
one object and not by another.  Hence, the reason why an intuitive cognition…is 
proper to one singular thing [and not another] is not similarity but only causality; 
no other cause can be assigned.34  
 
In these texts, Ockham claims that even when intuitive cognitions are not 
actually caused by the singular objects to which they are directed, these states 
are such that if they had been caused naturally (rather than supernaturally), 
they would have been caused by those object to which they refer.  Indeed, it 
would seem that even in the case where the intuition is of a non-existent, 
Ockham still wants to say that it is “causality” which explains why the 
intuition “is proper to” (i.e. is of or about) one thing and not any other.  These 
sorts of remarks make it look as if Ockham thinks that in cases of 
supernaturally produced intuition there is still a kind of object-dependence—
even a kind of causal dependence of intuitions on their objects.  If this is right, 
perhaps there’s something to the causal externalist reading after all.  For, one 
can then take these passages as claiming that even supernaturally induced 
intuitions are broadly individuated—namely, by (counter-factual) casual 
relations to their (possibly non-actual) singular objects. 
Let us grant, for the moment, that it is possible to read such passages in this 
way.  Even so, several observations are in order.  First, it is important to see 
                                                 
33
  Rep. II.qq.12-13 (OTh V, 289).  
34
  Quodl. I.13 (OTh IX, 76). 
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that the version of externalism under consideration is, at best, only a form of 
weak externalism.  This is because the object on which a supernatural intuition 
depends needn’t be present anywhere in the subject’s immediate environment. 
(Indeed, it need not even actually exist!).35  Certainly, such a view may still 
qualify as externalist, but it is a far cry from the sort of view that goes by the 
name in current the discussions (to which Ockham’s views are, as we’ve seen, 
often favorably compared).  In fact, the variety of externalism on offer here is 
so week that it looks to be perfectly compatible with the strongest varieties of 
internalism defended by contemporary philosophers.36  
Second, even granting that Ockham’s account of intuition may constitute a 
variety of (weak) externalism, it should be clear that it cannot be taken to 
constitute any kind of causal externalism.  Although the relation in terms of 
which intuitive states are individuated on this view makes reference to 
causality, the relation is not, in fact, one of causing.  On the contrary, it is a 
relation of counterfactual (causal) dependence.  Of course, one could stipulate 
that mere reference to causation is all that’s required for a view to qualify as 
causal externalism.  But here again it’s clear that, at least from a contemporary 
perspective, the type of “causal externalism” in question is so attenuated as to 
barely merit the name.  Indeed, to the extent that Ockham’s commentators 
have been tempted to see his account as an early analogue of contemporary 
versions of causal externalism, they appear to have paid too little attention to 
the implications of supernaturally produced intuitions. 
Third, it’s important to see that, however weak or attenuated the proposed 
version of externalism is, it may still be too strong for Ockham.  This is 
because the view on offer entails a commitment to non-existent objects (or 
mere possibilia) and there is a good deal of textual evidence which suggests 
that Ockham wants to restrict his ontology to what is actual.37  Hence, to the 
                                                 
35
  Actually, strictly speaking, in order to qualify as a version of weak externalism by the 
McGinn definition we’d have to broaden that definition just a bit (so that relevant dependence 
relation includes dependence on objects that have a mode of reality less than actual existence). 
36
  Thus, Gabriel Segal—a well-known proponent of internalism—argues that weak 
externalism is perfectly compatible with internalist views of mental content.  See Gabriel 
Segal, A Slim Book about Narrow Content, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000). 
37
  Not only are there are a number of texts in which Ockham appears to explicitly reject the 
notion what is non-actual has any kind of being or reality, but he also has straightforward 
theological reasons for doing so.  According to Ockham, God is the only being that exists 
necessarily—everything else is both created and contingent.  But possibilia appear to be a type 
of necessary being (they are, after all, necessarily possible) and, as such, would possess being 
or reality independently of God’s intellect or will. This is perhaps why Ockham claims that all 
uncreated creatures (his vocabulary for possibilia) exist only “in their cause” (namely, in God); 
and that they are nothing distinct from the divine essence itself.  See Ord I d. 36, q.1 (OTh IV, 
550).  For discussion of Ockham’s committment to non-existent entities see Adams, William 
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extent that this interpretation saddles him with a commitment to possiblia, it 
must, for that reason if no other, be seen as highly contentious.  
A fourth and final observation is this.  Even if it’s possible to read the 
foregoing passages as committing Ockham to some version of externalism 
(whether causal or not), it must be said that without some independent 
motivation for taking them this way, there’s no obvious reason for doing so.  
For, in fact, all the passages we’ve looked at are perfectly compatible with a 
purely internalist interpretation.  Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
intuitive cognitions are not dependent on anything external to the mind, and, 
thus, that Ockham holds a purely internalist account of intuitive content.  We 
can still make good sense of the claims he makes about the counterfactual 
causal relations between supernatural intuitions and their objects.  We could 
say, for example, that what makes it true that a supernaturally induced intuition 
could have been caused (naturally) by just one object is the nature of the 
intuitive act itself—namely, its content being such that that act could only 
(naturally) be the product of one particular object.  Not only is this 
interpretation compatible with Ockham’s claims, but some of his remarks even 
seem to tell in favor of it.  For example, Ockham sometimes speaks of intuitive 
states—whether naturally or supernaturally produced—as being in themselves 
“suited” (or “apt”) to be caused in certain ways.38  Again, he sometimes 
characterizes intuitive acts as “determining for themselves” that they are 
caused by certain objects.39  One natural way of taking these remarks is to read 
them as making claims about the nature of intuitive cognitions and the way in 
which they determine or ground a relation to a single object.  Thus, while the 
relation between an intuitive cognition and its object would be an internal one 
(that is, one that obtains in any world in which both the relata exist), the 
obtaining of the relation itself would be determined by intrinsic features of the 
intuition—features that make it “suited to be caused by one object and not by 
any other.”   
If something like this is right, then causality plays at most a genetic role in 
Ockham’s account of intuitive cognition.  It would function merely as part of 
                                                                                                                                
Ockham, 400-416; Alfred Freddoso, “Ockham’s Theory of Truth Conditions,” in Ockham’s 
Theory of Propositions, trans. A. F. Freddoso and H. Shuurman (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1980), sec.5; Elizabeth Karger, “Would Ockham have Shaved Wyman’s 
Beard?” Franciscan Studies 40 (1980): 244-64; Calvin Normore, “Some Aspects of Ockham’s 
Logic,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. P. V. Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), sec. 3; Paul Spade, “Ockham’s Nominalist Metaphysics,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. P. V. Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
38
  Quodl. I.13 (OTh IX, 76) 
39
  Rep. II.qq.12-13 (OTh V, 289) 
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an explanation of how, in the natural course of things, we come to occupy 
intuitive states with a given intentional content, and not as part of an 
explanation of the constitution or determination of such states.  And, this is the 
way Ockham himself tends to speak about causality.  Consider, for example, 
the following passage:  
 
 Intuitive cognition cannot be caused or conserved naturally when the object does 
not exist. The reason for this is that a real effect cannot be caused or produced into 
being from non-being from what does not exist. As a result, naturally speaking, an 
intuitive cognition requires for its existence both a productive and a preservative 
cause.40  
 
Here, Ockham claims that intuitive cognitions depend (in the ordinary course 
of things) on the causal activity of their objects merely to “produce them into 
being from non-being”, and there is no indication that the causal connection 
does more than that.  Intuitions would, therefore, seem to depend on their 
object merely as a “productive and preservative cause” rather than as 
something constitutive of their identity.  Indeed, this is precisely why God can 
always serve in place of the object to produce an intuitive cognition with the 
very same content.   
 
3. AGAINST DIRECT REFERENCE: SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
As noted earlier, the received view of Ockham’s theory of intuition 
involves two theses: a causal thesis and a direct reference thesis.  Although, to 
this point, our focus has been on just the latter it should be clear that, if the 
argument of the previous section is correct and the internalist reading captures 
Ockham’s theory of intuition, the direct reference thesis will also be ruled out.  
If intuitive cognitions are not object-dependent in any way, their semantic or 
intentional function cannot be characterized in terms of direct designation or 
pure denotation.  Before closing, however, it is worth noting that there is 
further, independent evidence against the direct reference thesis—evidence 
which can be found in some of Ockham’s explicit remarks about both the 
semantic character of intuitive states and their role in judgment formation.   
Consider the fact that Ockham tends to describe intuitive cognition not 
only as an act of cognizing some singular object, but also as cognizing it in a 
certain way.  For instance, he says that, unlike abstractive acts, which abstract 
from existence and non-existence, intuitive cognitions present their object as 
existing or as not existing: “intuitive cognition is that by means of which a 
                                                 
40
  Quodl. VI.6 (OTh IX, 606) 
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thing is known to exist when it does exist, and not to exist when it does not 
exist.”41  And, as Ockham elsewhere suggests, intuitive cognitions present 
objects in other ways as well: “the intellect intuitively cognizes singulars as 
here and now and according to every other condition with respect to which the 
senses cognize (and even more as well).”42  Evidently, therefore, on Ockham’s 
view an intuitive cognition of some individual (say, Socrates) will present him 
not only as existing, but also as here and now, and perhaps also as pale, as 
next to Plato, and so on.  
If this understanding of his view is correct—and intuitive cognitions not 
only refer to their objects but also connote something about their existence and 
circumstances—it would explain why Ockham assigns intuition the role he 
does in the formation of existential and perceptual judgments. As we’ve seen, 
Ockham holds that when the intellect intuitively cognizes some object, it 
immediately forms a number of judgments about them.  Consider again the 
following passage:  
 
Intuitive cognition is such that when certain things are cognized, one of which inheres 
in the other, or is distant from the other, or stands in some relation to the other, it is at 
once known by virtue of this non-propositional cognition of those things whether a 
thing inheres or does not inhere, whether the thing is distant or not distant, and so on 
for other contingent truths. Thus, for instance, if Socrates is pale in reality, then 
cognition of Socrates and paleness is called intuitive cognition when, in virtue of such 
a cognition, one can evidently known that Socrates is pale.43  
 
Passages such as this one make clear that Ockham thinks that the mere 
possession of an intuitive cognition of an object immediately leads the intellect 
to assent to a number of “contingent truths” regarding its attributes, spatial 
location, relations, etc.  But why would he think this?  The most natural and 
straightforward explanation is that he thinks intuition itself somehow presents 
or represents the object as having those attributes, locations, relations, etc.  
After all, if an intuition is purely referential, and thus denotes Socrates and 
paleness but does not present Socrates as pale (or paleness as inhering in 
Socrates), it is difficult to see why Ockham would claim that just “by virtue 
of” having such an intuition one could immediately and evidently judge that 
Socrates is pale.  
What is more, there is a passage in which Ockham explicitly allows that 
one can have “more than one simple and proper concept of one and the same 
thing”—that is to say, one can have qualitatively distinct intuitions of one and 
                                                 
41
  Rep. II.qq.12-13 (OTh V, 286). Cf. Quodl. V.5 (OTh IX, 496) 
42
  Rep. II.qq.12-13 (OTh V, 284). 
43
  Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 (OTh I, 31) 
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the same object.44  This can occur, for example, in cases where the cognizing 
subject moves closer and closer to the object so that, as he draws near, “his 
vision of it is intensified and becomes clearer.”45  Evidently, Ockham is 
supposing that, in such a case, a cognizer will have several distinct intuitions or 
“visions” of the same object as he moves—“visions which,” he says, “are the 
same in species [that is, they are intuitions of the same object], but differ only 
as more or and less perfect.”46  But that is just to suppose that the intuitions of 
the object differ not only in number, but also in representational content—that 
is to say, that each intuitive act presents the object in a different way depending 
on the vantage point of the cognizer.  That such intuitions differ in content is 
clear since, as Ockham proceeds to explain, each gives rise to a different 
perceptual judgment: 
 
…as he [the cognizer] approaches the visible object (say, that it is a white 
thing)…diverse judgments can be caused—for example, that the thing seen is a being, 
or is a body, or is a color, or [has] whiteness.47 
 
All this, of course, strongly suggests that intuitive cognitions cannot, as many 
commentators have supposed, be directly or purely referential states—in the 
sense that their reference to an object exhausts their intentional or semantic 
function.  After all, if intuitive cognitions lack any sort of internal or 
representational structure, we seem to be left with no way to account for 
Ockham’s claim that numerically distinct intuitions of one and the same object 
may lead to different perceptual judgments.  
Although intuitive cognitions can be understood to function as singular 
terms in the language of thought, we shouldn’t be too quick to classify them as 
directly referential (or “logically proper”) expressions.  For, as the foregoing 
considerations suggest, these states seem to involve some connotative 
content—indeed, they would seem to bear a remarkable resemblance to a type 
of singular expression that comes to be referred to by later logicians as a 
“vague individual” (individuum vagum).48   A vague individual is a type 
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  For more on later medieval discussions of this category of singular term see E. J. Ashworth, 
“Singular Terms and Singular Concepts: from Buridan to the Early Sixteenth Century,” in 
John Buridan and Beyond: Topics in Language and Sciences 1300-1700, eds. R. L. Freidmann 
and S. Ebbesen (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Science and Letters, 2004); E. J. 
Ashworth, “Singular Terms and Predication in Some Late Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century 
Thomistic Logicians,” in Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language, eds. A. 
Maierù and L. Valente (Florence: Olschki, 2004); Henrik Lagerlund, “Vague Concepts and 
 18 
expression (or concept)—such as ‘this human’ or ‘this white thing’—that is 
semantically singular, but complex in representational content; it refers to 
exactly one individual, but conveys or connotes something about its nature or 
“individual circumstances”.  Now, obviously, it would take us too far a field to 
explore the resemblance between Ockham’s intuitive cognitions and the notion 
of vague singulars.49  Suffice it to say, however, that to the extent that 
intuitions function as something akin to vague singular concepts—that is, to 
the extent that they are connotative in nature or present their object under 
certain (general) aspects—to that same extent they are ill-suited to serve as 
‘logically proper’ or directly referential mental expressions.50    
                                                                                                                                
Singular Terms in a Buridanian Language of Thought Tradition,” in Intentionality, Cognition, 
and Representation in the Middle Ages, ed. G. Klima (Fordham: Fordham University Press, 
forthcoming).  
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 The prima facia similarity between Ockham’s characterizations of intuitive cognition and 
vague individual concepts is quite remarkable.  Not only do Ockham’s intuitive cognitions 
appear to be connotative in nature, but they also clearly do involve a kind of semantic or 
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accounting for the intentionality of intuitive cognition, he is also happy to speak of intuitive 
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Ockham says that a given act of intuitive cognition “is not more a similitude of one [object] 
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intuitive acts in accounting for the singularity.   
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